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Abstract
We consider a competitive insurance market in which agents can privately enter into multi-
contractual insurance relationships and undertake hidden actions. We study the existence of linear
equilibria when insurance companies do not have any restriction on their pricing rules. We provide
conditions under which a linear equilibrium exists. We show that two different types of linear
equilibria could exist: A first one in which insurance companies make zero expected profits, and
a second one in which they make strictly positive expected profits. We also analyze the welfare
properties of the linear equilibria. We show that they are not always second best Pareto optimal.
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1 Introduction
An exclusive contractual relationship implies that a party in a contract can restrict the other party’s
participations in contractual relationships with other institutions. This requires the institution which
designs the contract to be able to perfectly monitor the other party’s trades with other institutions and
these trades to be observable and verifiable by a court of justice in order to enforce the exclusivity clause
of the contract. These are very strong assumptions. Thus, except when it is forbidden by law, insurance
contractual relationships are rather nonexclusive. Moreover, most of the time only the insured knows
the full set of contracts he has subscribed. In this article, we thus consider a competitive insurance
market in which agents can privately contract with several insurance companies and are subject to
moral hazard. In this context, we study the existence of linear equilibria when insurance companies do
not have any restriction on their pricing rules. Moreover, we also look at the welfare properties of the
linear equilibria.
In order to study nonexclusive competition in insurance contracts we consider a model of common
agency. We modelize insurance companies as principals offering contracts to agents who can privately
choose several contracts among those which are offered and who each exerts an unobservable and costly
effort which affects the probability of the accident they are each facing. Our model is close to Hellwig’s
(1983) and Bisin and Guaitoli’s (2004) models except that agents can exert a continuum of effort. This
is a crucial assumption, since it allows us to provide a sufficient condition on the existence of linear
equilibria (which would not be possible with a discrete effort).
From a methodological point of view, we follow Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002) who
study common agency games. In single-principal models the celebrated revelation principle tells us
that one can restrict attention to revealing mechanisms without loss of generality. In other words, in
a context of moral hazard a single principal has no reason to offer a menu of contracts. However, in
common agency models, such as ours, this is no longer the case. The former authors have then shown
that one can assume that principals, here insurance companies, offer menus (which are sets of contracts)
and then characterize all the possible equilibria of the game. Hence in our model, insurance companies
may offer more than one contract (but they are not constrained to do so).
We first provide conditions under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which insurance
companies issue linear contracts. That is, in equilibrium each insurance company offers linear prices,
agents choose a repayment and pay a price proportional to it. This equilibrium emerges in a setting
in which insurance companies are free to offer any kind of menus of contracts. In particular, they
can offer non linear contracts. This differs substantially both from Pauly’s (1974) and Arnott and
Stiglitz’s (1988, and 1991) results which are derived in a setting in which insurance companies are
restricted to offer linear contracts. Our result on the existence of linear equilibria implies that both
Pauly’s and Arnott and Stiglitz’s approaches have micro economic foundations. In other words, in
this class of models the existence of a pure strategy linear equilibrium can (almost always) be taken
as granted. Hellwig (1983) also looks at the existence of linear equilibria. However, he only considers
isoelastic utility functions while we study IARA, CARA and DARA utility functions. He shows that
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linear equilibria always exist if the exponent of the utility function is nonnegative (i.e., if relative risk
aversion is not greater than one). With CARA utility functions, we show that linear equilibria always
exist since the willingness to pay for more insurance is increasing in wealth. The existence property of
linear equilibria is very robust since in particular it does not rely on any assumption on the function
which links an agent’s probability of accident to the effort he exerts. We show that this result is still
valid with IARA utility functions when moral hazard is weak.1 For DARA utility functions the linear
equilibrium existence property still relies on the fact that the willingness to pay for more insurance is
increasing in wealth, but it also relies on assumptions on the function which links the probability of
accident to the agent’s effort.
Second, we show that when moral hazard is quite strong, the linear equilibria are such that insurance
companies have strictly positive expected profits. In traditional Bertrand competition model there is
no strictly positive (expected) profit in equilibrium since firms could then deviate, make aggressive
offers and take all the markets. However, in our model insurance companies cannot do so as they fear
agents to take the deviating offer, complement it with other offers (since insurance contracts are not
exclusive) and exert a low level of effort which would make the deviating offer unprofitable. We thus
show that strictly positive (expected) profits in a competitive setting as in Parlour and Rajan (2001)
can also exist when the effort exerted by an agent is continuous and not simply binary.2
Finally, we analyze the welfare properties of the linear equilibria. When moral hazard is weak
we show that the linear equilibrium could either be second best optimal or not. The (second best)
optimality depends on the properties of the function which links the probability of accident to the
agent’s effort. When moral hazard is quite strong, we then show that the linear equilibria are not
generically second best Pareto efficient. Moreover, since the linear equilibria are not necessarily second
best Pareto optimal, we also discuss the opportunity of a government intervention on the insurance
market and for instance the interest to impose exclusive insurance contracts by law.
This paper is related to the literature which studies nonexclusive contracts under a common agency
games framework. Common agency games have been a very useful framework to analyze economic issues
in particular in the field of insurance. Following an approach close to ours, Ales and Maziero (2009)
study the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) adverse selection model when insurance contracts
are not exclusive.3 Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) consider a setting in which agents design their own
contracts (insurance companies can only either accept or reject the agents’ offers), make contractual
decisions sequentially, and have contractual portfolios, which are observable but not contractible upon.
Their setting is quite different from ours as well as their results. In particular, in Kahn and Mookherjee’s
environment insurance companies make zero profits and agents face fair insurance prices in equilibrium
while this is not always the case in our setting. Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) allow for negative insurance
1 We precisely define what the meaning of weak moral hazard is in the paper.
2 Parlour and Rajan (2001) use a common agency games framework to analyze credit relationships. They obtain strictly
positive expected profits, in equilibrium, in the case of a competitive credit market.
3 They show that there exists only a linear equilibrium in which all insurance companies offer the same menu of contracts.
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contracts (i.e., insurance contracts that pay when there is no accident).4 They thus obtain equilibria
which are based on latent contracts, that is, on contracts which are offered by insurance companies
but never subscribed in equilibrium. On the contrary, the linear equilibria we obtain are not based
on latent contracts. Attar and Chassagnon (2009) in the same setting as that of Bisin and Guaitoli
(2004) look at the welfare properties of the equilibria. They show that market equilibria may fail to
be- even -third best efficient. We also look at the welfare properties of the linear equilibria we get, but
we obtain different results. Finally, Attar, Campioni, Chassagnon and Rajan (2006) restrict the set
of contracts that insurance companies can offer to linear or partially linear contracts while we do not
restrict insurance contracts at all.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyses the agent’s
indifference curves. Section 4 analyses the linear equilibria with non exclusivity. Section 5 looks at the
welfare properties of the linear equilibria. Section 6 presents concluding remarks. Formal proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a competitive insurance market which is derived from Mossin’s (1968) classical model
of insurance. There is a continuum of identical agents of measure 1 and a finite number of identical
insurance companies, indexed by i with i ∈ I = {1; . . . ;N}.
2.1 Agents
Each agent faces a fixed-damage accident denoted L. The accident is distributed by a Bernoulli distrib-
ution. There are two states of the world: either no accident or accident. Without insurance the agent’s
consumption corresponds to w if there is no accident, while it is equal to w−L if there is an accident.
However, an agent can also subscribe insurance contracts. Insurance contracts are nonexclusive (i.e.,
each agent can buy several contracts from different insurance companies) and private information to
the agent. The insured agent’s consumption if there is no accident is w − P , where P =
∑N
i=1 pi cor-
responds to the sum of all premia pi paid by the agent to the insurance companies. However, if there
is an accident the insured agent’s consumption is w − L+ R − P , where R =
∑N
i=1 ri corresponds to
the sum of all repayments ri from the insurance companies. The probability of accident π (e) depends
on the effort e devoted by the agent to avoid the accident. The probability π (e) is decreasing at an
increasing rate, that is, π′ (e) < 0 and π′′ (e) > 0. We assume that e ∈ [e; e], where e, e respectively
denote the lowest and the highest level of effort that the agent can exert. Effort is unobservable by the
insurance companies and costly for the agent. Finally, we consider that the agent’s utility function is
separable in consumption and effort, and is event-independant.5 The expected utility of an agent can
be written as:
4 Note that Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) as well as Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) also study credit relationships.
5 This means that the occuring event does not affect the utility derived from consumption (i.e., the accident does not
alter tastes).
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U (w,L,R,P, e) = π (e)u (w − L+R− P ) + (1− π (e))u (w− P )− e, (1)
where u(.) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, with u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0. Without loss of
generality we assume that u(0) = 0 and w > L.
2.2 Insurance Companies
The insurance market is competitive. We thus assume that the number of insurance companies N is
large enough and each insurance company has no market power. There is no restriction on the kind
of contracts (ri, pi) that insurance companies can offer. However, it is impossible to write a contract
contingent either on an agent’s effort or on his insurance contracts with other insurance companies
since effort and insurance contracts are both private information to the agent.6 The expected profit of
an insurance company associated with an insurance contract (ri, pi) is equal to:
Πi (ri, pi, e) = pi − π (e) ri. (2)
2.3 The Contracting Game
Following the literature on common agency we allow insurance companies to offer “menus” of contracts.
Each insurance company offers a subset of all possible contracts, i.e., offers a subset of R2. To make
the problem tractable, we do assume that menus are closed subsets of R2. Given the offered menus
of contracts, the agent must choose a portfolio of contracts and an effort. We assume that each agent
must choose one and only one contract from each insurance company. Moreover, we assume that an
agent can always choose (ri, pi) = (0; 0), which corresponds to no insurance at all from company i. This
means that we constrain insurance company to propose menus containing contract (0, 0).7
The set of strategies of insurance company i is denoted by Mi and corresponds to the set of all closed
subsets of R2 containing (0; 0). By Mi we denote a generic element of Mi. By M we denote a collection
of menus offered by all the insurance companies, M = ×i∈I Mi, and by M−i we denote the collection
of menus offered by all insurance companies but company i: M−i = {M1, . . . ,Mi−1,Mi+1, . . . ,MN}.
Hence, we have M = (Mi,M−i). In the same way we will use the notation M = ×i∈IMi.
For an agent, a strategy is a mapping σ(.) that maps the set of menus M to an element of the
set M × [e; e]. By [pi (M) , ri (M) , e (M)] we denote the contract chosen by the agent in the menu
offered by insurance company i when he faces the collection of menus M . It follows that σ (M) =
[pi (M) , ri (M) , e (M)]i∈I .
The timing of the game is the following:
6 However, each insurance company does know all the contracts that it has signed with an agent.
7 Considering that an agent must choose one and only one contract from each insurance company’s menus of contracts
is not restrictive, since several contracts from the same insurance company, can always be pooled into a single contract.
Moreover, by constraining each insurance company to offer contract (0, 0) we implicitly assume that the agent has also
the possibility to choose "no contract at all" (not to be insured) from any insurance company.
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1. Insurance companies simultaneously offer menus of insurance contracts.
2. Each agent privately chooses insurance contracts and the level of effort he exerts.
3. Either the accident occurs or not and payoffs are paid accordingly.
In the following, we are going to use the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: Given
the menus of contracts issued by the insurance companies M , each agent (privately) chooses which
contracts to buy and his level of effort. This determines his consumption in the two states of the world:
No accident or accident. Each agent chooses both the set of insurance contracts and the level of effort
he exerts so as to maximize his expected utility, which is given in equation (1). Anticipating the choices
of each agent, as a function of the set of contracts they offer, insurance companies strategically choose
which contracts they issue so as to maximize their profit, which is given in equation (2).
In formal terms, the agent’s equilibrium strategy is a collection of mappings σ∗(.) such that
σ∗(M) ∈ argmax
(ri,pi)i∈I∈M, e∈[e,e]
π(e)u
(
w − L−
∑
i∈I
pi +
∑
i∈I
ri
)
+ [1− π(e)]u
(
w −
∑
i∈I
pi
)
− e. (3)
Following the preceding notation, for all M in M, we use the notation
σ∗(M) = [p∗i (M) , r
∗
i (M) , e
∗ (M)]i∈I .
Then equilibrium strategies of the principals are defined by:
∀i ∈ I, M∗i ∈ argmax
Mi∈Mi
pi
(
Mi,M
∗
−i
)
− π
[
e∗
(
Mi,M
∗
−i
)]
ri
(
Mi,M
∗
−i
)
. (4)
The two preceding conditions (3) and (4) define an equilibrium in our game.
In this article, we are interested in the existence of linear equilibria. A linear equilibrium is an equi-
librium in which the ratio insurance premium over repayment in case of accident is constant whatever
the repayment chosen. Thus, we are going to look at the existence of equilibria in which each insurance
company issues a continuum of linear contracts. In other words, in equilibrium, each company i offers
menus M∗i in which every contract (ri, pi) of the menu satisfies pi = αri, where α is a positive constant.
However, we do not restrict the insurance companies’ deviations to be linear. Deviations can be of any
type and in particular nonlinear.
In order to be able to study equilibria in the insurance market we must first determine the indiffer-
ence curves’ properties. Indeed, the agent’s optimal choice in terms of insurance and his optimal level
of effort are both going to depend on the indifference curves’ properties.
3 Indifference Curves Properties
Consider an agent’s indirect utility function for a given (global) insurance contract (R,P ). The indirect
utility function, which we denote V (R,P ), is computed for e = e∗, where e∗ corresponds to the effort
which maximizes the agent’s expected utility. Thus,
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V (R,P ) = π(e∗)u (w − L+R− P ) + (1− π(e∗))u (w − P )− e∗, (5)
and any indifference curve is characterized by:
V (R,P ) = A, with A ∈ R. (6)
3.1 Agent’s Optimal level of Effort
For any given insurance contract (R,P ) an agent exerts the level of effort which maximizes his expected
utility. Using Equation (1) and computing the first order condition with respect to e, we obtain the
optimal level of effort exerted by an agent when the maximization program admits an interior solution.
In this case, e∗ is such that
π′(e∗) [u (w − L+R− P )− u (w − P )] = 1. (7)
There are also two possible corner solutions: e∗ = e or e∗ = e. For instance, if there is full insurance
(R = L) an agent’s consumption is the same whether there is accident or not. The agent has thus no
incentive to exert an effort higher than e since, for a given probability of accident, his expected utility
is decreasing with the effort he exerts. Moreover, for any given P an agent also exerts e∗ = e when
R > L. Consider now that R < L. Let us define R (P ) as the implicit solution of Equality (7) for e = e.
For any given P , R (P ) is thus such that
π′ (e) [u (w −L+R− P )− u (w − P )] = 1. (8)
An agent optimally chooses to exert an effort e < e∗ ≤ e when R < R (P ), while he optimally exerts
the lowest effort for R ≥ R (P ). Applying the implicit function theorem to Equality (8), we obtain:
dR (P )
dP
=
u′ (w − L+R− P )− u′ (w − P )
u′ (w − L+R− P )
> 0,
since u′(.) > 0, but u′′(.) < 0. This implies that the minimal repayment R (P ) above which an agent
chooses to exert the lowest effort e increases with P .
Let us now consider the particular case in which an agent is not insured, R = 0 (and thus P = 0).
Equality (7) indicates that the agent optimally chooses to exert an effort e < e∗ ≤ e if and only if:
u (w)− u (w − L) > −
1
π′ (e)
. (CI)
Thus, condition CI implies that for any positive premium P ≥ 0, we have R (P ) ∈ ]0;L]. We are going
to assume that condition CI is satisfied henceforth. This condition allows to simplify the analysis of
the model without qualitatively altering the results.
In order to fully study the function R (P ) two cases should be distinguished. Consider first that
lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞. Then, R(P = 0) is such that
π′ (e) [u (w − L+R)− u (w)] = 1. (9)
7
However, for any R < L (even for R very close to L) we necessarily have
π′ (e) [u (w− L+R)− u (w)] > 1
In other words, the marginal gain of effort is strictly higher than the marginal cost of effort. This
implies that for any R < L the agent exerts an effort e < e∗ ≤ e. We thus have R(P = 0) = L.
Therefore, for any P ≥ 0 we necessarily also have R (P ) = L since R(P = 0) = L and R (P ) is
increasing in P . Consider now that lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞. Then, for R < L, but R ≃ L we necessarily have
π′ (e) [u (w − L+R)− u (w)] < 1 by continuity (since π′ (e) [u (w − L+R)− u (w)] < 1 for R = L).
This implies that R(P = 0) < L in this case.
The following lemma sums up the previous results.
Lemma 1 For any given P ≥ 0 an agent exerts an effort e < e∗ ≤ e for R < R (P ), while he exerts the
lowest effort e∗ = e for R ≥ R (P ). Moreover, under condition CI an agent exerts an effort e < e
∗ ≤ e
in the case of no insurance (R = 0 = P ). When lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞ then: ∀P , R (P ) = L. However, when
lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞ then R(P = 0) < L and R (P ) is strictly increasing in P with R (P ) < L.
Now that we know whether the agent exerts an effort higher or just equal to e we can look at
the differentiability of the indifference curves and at the properties of the agent’s marginal rate of
substitution between R and P .
3.2 Differentiability of the Indifference Curves and Marginal Rate of Substitution
between R and P
Consider first that R ≥ R (P ). Any indifference curve is then "well shaped" and exhibits the standard
properties, since the effort is then fixed (e∗ = e). This implies that for R ≥ R (P ) any indifference
curve is always differentiable in R. Consider now that R ≤ R (P ). The inequality π′′ (e) > 0 implies
that π′ (e) is strictly increasing. Thus, for a given {w;L;R;P} the first order condition (i.e., Equality
7) admits a unique solution. Suppose the contrary and consider that the first order condition admits
two solutions at point A: (RA;PA). Denote e
∗
Left the agent’s optimal effort at the left, but close to
point A. Moreover, denote e∗Right (with e
∗
Left = e
∗
Right) the agent’s optimal effort at the right, but close
to point A. Then, by continuity both e∗Left and e
∗
Right should correspond to the agent’s optimal effort,
and should both satisfy Equality 7. We thus obtain a contradiction. Note that when RA = R (PA) the
same reasoning applies with, in this case, e∗Right = e. Suppose now that an indifference curve is not
differentiable at point A (i.e., the indifference curve has a kink at (RA;PA)). Consider the constrained
indifference curve for which the agent is constrained to exert the level of effort which is optimal at
point A (i.e., e∗ (RA;PA)). We denote this indifference curve CIC(e
∗ (RA;PA)). By definition the
unconstrained indifference curve corresponds to the constrained indifference curve only at point A.
Consider now another constrained indifference curve associated to ê = e∗ (RA;PA). We denoted this
indifference curve ĈIC. By definition of ê (which is different from e∗ (RA;PA), since e
∗ (RA;PA) is
unique), for ĈIC to be associated to the same utility as CIC(e∗ (RA;PA)), ĈIC should be located
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strictly below CIC(e∗ (RA;PA)) in the mark (R,P ), since an agent’s utility function is, ceteris paribus,
increasing in R but decreasing in P . Thus, in the neighborhood of point A, ê cannot correspond to the
optimal level of effort. This reasoning applies for any level of effort even close to e∗ (RA;PA). We thus
have a contradiction, since the optimal level of effort exerted by an agent is continuous in R and P .
This leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For R ≥ 0, any indifference curve is always differentiable in R.
Let us now study the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between R and P (denoted MRSagent
hereafter). The differentiability of the indifference curves implies that MRSagent is always defined.
Moreover, using Equality (6) we obtain that MRSagent is equal to
dP
dR
=
π(e∗)u′ (w− L+R− P )
π(e∗)u′ (w − L+R− P ) + [1− π(e∗)]u′ (w − P )
. (10)
MRSagent is positive since the utility of an agent is increasing in R, but decreasing in P . Note
that MRSagent(R = L) = π (e∗) = π (e) since the agent exerts the lowest effort when he is fully
insured. Moreover, any indifference curve is "well shaped", that is, increasing at a decreasing rate
when R ≥ R (P ). Thus, MRSagent along the indifference curve only depends on the properties of
the utility function u(.) when R ≥ R (P ). However, for any R ∈ [0;R[ an indifference curve is not
necessarily well shaped since MRSagent also depends on e∗ which is affected by P and R. As it has
already been demonstrated by Helpman and Laffont (1975) moral hazard can give rise to non-convexity
of the indifference curves.
However, even if the indifference curves are not necessarily convex for R ∈ [0;R[ we are wondering
if, for a given R , the agent’s marginal rate of substitution is strictly decreasing with P . In other
words, we are wondering if for a given reimbursement (with R < R (P )) the marginal willingness to
pay decreases when the price to pay P , increases. This is an important property that we are going to
use when studying the existence of linear equilibria.
For a given repayment R with R < R (P ), MRSagent (R,P ) is going to be strictly decreasing in P
if and only if
∂MRSagent(R,P )
∂P
< 0 or equivalently if
∂MRSagent(R,P )
∂w
> 0, since P and −w play the same
role in the agent’s utility function. Using relations (7) and (10), ∂MRSagent(R,P )
∂w
> 0 if and only if
−
u′′ (w − P )
u′ (w − P )
+
π′(e∗)
π(e∗) [1− π (e∗)]
de∗
dw
> −
u′′ (w − L+R− P )
u′ (w− L+R− P )
. (11)
For R < R (P ) we know that e < e∗ ≤ e. Thus, de
∗
dw
= −π
′(e∗)[u′(w−L+R−P )−u′(w−P )]
π”(e∗)[u(w−L+R−P )−u(w−P )]
< 0, which
implies that π
′(e∗)
π(e∗)[1−π(e∗)]
de∗
dw
> 0. For CARA utility functions, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-
aversion, −u
′′
u
′ , is constant. Thus, −
u′′(w−P )
u′(w−P ) = −
u′′(w−L+R−P )
u′(w−L+R−P ) and inequality (11) is then necessarily
satisfied. For IARA utility functions the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion is strictly
increasing. If R < R (P ) ≤ L then w − P > w − L + R − P and thus −u
′′(w−P )
u′(w−P ) > −
u′′(w−L+R−P )
u′(w−L+R−P ) .
Therefore, inequality (11) is also necessarily satisfied in the case of IARA utility functions. For DARA
utility functions the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion is strictly decreasing. This implies
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that −u
′′(w−P )
u′(w−P ) < −
u′′(w−L+R−P )
u′(w−L+R−P ) since R < R (P ) ≤ L. Thus, for DARA utility functions inequality
(11) is satisfied if and only if
π′(e∗)
π(e∗) [1− π(e∗)]
de∗
dw
> −
u′′ (w− L+R− P )
u′ (w − L+R− P )
−
(
−
u′′ (w − P )
u′ (w− P )
)
or equivalently
[π′(e∗)]2
π(e∗)[1−π(e∗)]π′′(e∗) >[
u′′(w−P )
u′(w−P ) −
u′′(w−L+R−P )
u′(w−L+R−P )
]
× u(w−P )−u(w−L+R−P )
u′(w−L+R−P )−u′(w−P ) .
(CII)
We thus obtain a condition on the function π (e), which should be satisfied at e = e∗. Under this
condition MRSagent is strictly decreasing with respect to P for a given repayment R with R < R (P )
even in the case of DARA utility functions.8
The following lemma summarizes the previous results.
Lemma 3 For any given repayment R with R < R (P ), the agent’s marginal rate of substitution is
strictly decreasing with respect to P in the case of:
• CARA utility functions,
• IARA utility functions,
• DARA utility functions if and only if the function π (e) satisfies condition CII .
The intuition of the previous lemma is the following. For a given repayment R an increase in
the premium to pay P is equivalent to a decrease in the wealth of the agent. But, ceteris paribus
the agent’s effort strictly increases when the agent’s wealth decreases when R < R (P ), that is, when
e < e∗ ≤ e. This result comes from the properties of the utility function. Consider Equality (7) which
indicates the optimal effort exerted by the agent. For a given (R,P ) the difference in utility when
the accident occurs or when it does not (u (w − L+R− P )− u (w − P )) increases when w decreases,
since the utility function u(.) is increasing and concave. Therefore, ceteris paribus the agent’s optimal
effort increases when w decreases, since the marginal gain of effort increases while the marginal cost
of effort does not change. This implies that for a given repayment R with R ≤ R (P ) the accident
probability strictly decreases when the premium P increases. Consider now first the case of CARA
utility functions. For a given R with R ≤ R (P ), the decrease in the probability of accident implies
8u(w) is a DARA utility function if and only if the degree of absolute risk aversion: −u
′′
(w)
u
′
(w)
, is decreasing in w.
Making computations, one can show that this is the case if and only if: −u
′′′
(w)
u
′′
(w)
> −
u
′′
(w)
u
′
(w)
(with u
′′′
(w) > 0), that is if
the degree of absolute prudence is strictly greater than the degree of absolute risk aversion. Therefore, CII is necessarily
satisfied if the degree of absolute prudence is close to the degree of absolute risk aversion, which amounts to say that the
utility function is not "too" DARA. Indeed, in this case the RHS of CII is going to be close to 0 (since we would have
u′′(w−P )
u′(w−P) ≃
u′′(w−L+R−P )
u′(w−L+R−P ) ) while the LHS is strictly positive.
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that the agent’s marginal willingness to pay in order to buy insurance, which corresponds to MRSagent,
decreases when the premium P increases. Second, consider the case of IARA utility functions. For a
given R with R ≤ R (P ), the agent’s willingness to pay necessarily decreases when P increases since the
agent exerts a higher effort which decreases the probability of accident and becomes less risk averse (an
increase in P is equivalent to a decrease in w). Finally, consider the case of DARA utility functions.
For a given R with R ≤ R (P ), the effect of an increase in P on the willingness to pay of the agent is
now ambiguous. On the one hand, the decrease in the probability of accident goes for a decrease in
the willingness to pay. However, an agent characterized by a DARA utility function becomes more risk
averse when P increases. Overall, the latter effect is dominated by the former effect when condition
CII is satisfied.
Note that Lemma 3 is equivalent to say that, ceteris paribus, the agent ’s willingness to pay for
more insurance is increasing in wealth when R < R (P ). Consider first, the case of CARA utility
functions. When the wealth of an agent increases, ceteris paribus, the effort he exerts decreases. He is
thus willing to buy more insurance in order to compensate the increase in the probability of accident
he faces. Consider now the case of IARA utility functions. The agent is then more willing to buy more
insurance when his wealth increases, since the probability of accident increases and he becomes more
risk averse. Finally, consider the case of DARA utility functions. There are thus two countervailing
effects. However, under condition CII the increase in the probability of accident dominates the decrease
in the agent’s risk aversion associated with an increase in wealth.
Before looking at the linear equilibria with non exclusivity, consider the following remark about
condition CII .
Remark 1 Condition CII is written with respect to e
∗ which is endogenous. Nevertheless, we can
also write a condition with respect to exogenous variables. More precisely, the agent’s marginal rate of
substitution is strictly decreasing with respect to P if and only if, ∀e :
[π′(e)]2
π(e) [1− π(e)]π′′(e)
>
u′′ (w − P )u′ (w− P ) − u′′ (w − L+R− P )u′ (w− L+R− P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
× u (w − P )− u (w − L+R− P )u′ (w − L+R− P )− u′ (w − P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
.
(CIII)
Note that the RHD of condition CIII is always finite. Indeed, for R strictly different from P , Term1
and Term2 are both defined and finite. Moreover, for R close to P , we have:
Term2 =
u(w−P )−u(w−L+R−P )
(w−P )−(w−L+R−P )
−u
′(w−P )−u′(w−L+R−P )
(w−P )−(w−L+R−P )
= −
u′ (w− P )
u′′ (w − P )
.
Term2 is thus well defined and finite. Since Term1 tends to zero as R tends to P , condition CIII then
becomes [π
′(e)]2
π(e)[1−π(e)]π′′(e) > 0. Therefore, it is always possible to define a function π(e) which satisfies
condition CIII . In the following, we are going to consider condition CII only, since condition CII is
less restrictive than condition CIII .
We can now look at the linear equilibria with non exclusivity.
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4 Linear Equilibria with Non Exclusivity
In order to study an equilibrium we should take into account any deviation of any insurance company.
However, it is almost impossible to do so since the set of all insurance companies’ strategies, Mi, is a
set of closed subsets of R2. In the following lemma we show that considering single offers only at the
deviation stage is not restrictive. This simplifies drastically the analysis.
Lemma 4 If an insurance company has no profitable deviation toward a single offer, then no deviation
toward any menu of contracts is profitable.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Company i has no profitable single offer deviation, but there is a more
sophisticated menu of contracts, denoted Mi, which gives it a higher payoff. Then, if the agent buys
contract (pi, ri) in Mi, offering Mi or simply the "menu" {(pi, ri)} is equivalent for company i. Indeed,
in the two cases the agent chooses contract (pi, ri) eventually. Finally, if the agent does not buy any
contract in Mi, the single contract (0, 0) is equivalent to Mi for company i. Therefore, considering
single offers only at the deviation stage is not restrictive.
We are now going to look at the linear equilibria. Consider that each insurance company issues a
continuum of linear contracts (ri, pi) with pi = π (e) ri. Then, given these insurance contracts max-
imizing the expected utility of an agent amounts to finding the highest indifference curve tangent to
P (e), where P (e) is defined as the straight half-line P (e) = π (e)R in the mark (R,P ), starting from
(0; 0). Denote by IC the indifference curve which is tangent to P (e) when there is full insurance, that
is, for R = L. The indifference curve IC corresponds to all the couples (R,P ) which are such that the
indirect utility function V (R,P ) = u (w− π (e)L)− e ≡ u. There are two possibilities, which should
be distinguished. Either IC has no other intersection (or tangent) point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)),
or IC has at least one other intersection (or tangent) point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)).
Consider the (particular) constrained indifference curve, for which the agent is constrained to exert
a particular level of effort e, with e ∈ ]e; e] and which is associated to the level of utility u. We denote
this indifference curve CIC (e, π (e) , u). CIC (e, π (e) , u) is then well shaped and depending on the
value π (e) either intersects or not the straight half-line P (e). There is thus necessarily a particular
value π (e) ≡ πT for which there exists a value of reimbursement RT such that CIC
(
e, π (e) = πT , u
)
is tangent to P (e). Characterizing the tangent point to P (e) amounts to finding the couple
(
RT ;πT
)
which satisfies:{
πTu
(
w − L+RT − π (e)RT
)
+
(
1− πT
)
u
(
w − π (e)RT
)
− e = u,
MRSagent
(
CIC (e, u) computed at R = RT
)
= π (e) .
(System 1)
Doing the same for all e ∈ ]e; e] and defining πT = π (e) = β with β ∈ ]0, 1[ for e = e we have thus
built a particular function πT (e) for any e ∈ [e; e].9 Let us now consider the unconstrained indifference
9 Note that πT (e) is decreasing in e. Indeed, when the effort increases the first equality of System 1 implies that π
should decrease so as to have the LHD equals to the RHS of the equality since at the tangent point we necessarily have
R < L for any e ∈ ]e; e].
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curve associated to πT (e) and u. This particular indifference curve, which we denote IC
(
πT (e)
)
is,
by construction, confounded with a segment of P (e) for e ∈ ]e; e[.
Comparing π (e) to πT (e) we are now able to indicate whether IC has either no other intersection
point or has at least one other intersection point with P (e), for R < R (P (e)).
Lemma 5 If ∀e ∈ ]e; e] we have π (e) > πT (e), then IC has no other intersection (or tangent) point
with P (e) for R < R (P (e)).
Contrarily, if there is at least one level of effort e ∈ ]e; e] for which π (e) ≤ πT (e), then IC either
intersects or is tangent to P (e) for at least one level of effort e > e.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of the previous lemma is the following. Consider the extreme case in which the
probability of accident does not depend on the level of effort: ∀e π (e) = π (e). The agent thus exerts
the lowest level of effort e since exerting an effort is costly. In this case IC is well shaped and never
intersects P (e) for any R < L. Consider now that the hazard moral is weak in the sense that the effort
only slightly affects the probability of accident, that is, π (e) is decreasing in e but π(e) ≃ π (e). Then,
by continuity with the previous case IC does not intersects P (e) for any R < L. Consider now that
the hazard moral problem is strong in the sense that π (e) is decreasing in e and π (e) is significantly
(strictly) lower than π (e). Then, the risk averse agent can choose to exert an effort strictly higher
than e in order to decrease significantly the probability of effort. Moreover, IC is going to be so badly
shaped that it intersects P (e).
Let us now start with the case in which IC has no other intersection (or tangent) point with P (e)
for R < R (P (e)).
4.1 Full Insurance Equilibrium
When the indifference curve IC has no other intersection point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)), then the
highest indifference curve tangent to P (e) is precisely IC.10 Therefore, the agent optimally chooses
to be fully insured and exerts an effort e∗ = e. Given the agent’s optimal effort and insurance choice
(e∗ = e,R = L) the insurance pricing is actuarially fair, and the expected profit of an insurance
company is equal to 0.
This situation is an equilibrium if and only if, taking into account any kind of deviation (that is, not
only linear deviations), there is no profitable deviation for any insurance company. Consider that an
insurance company deviates and issues a single contract Cd1 = (rd1 , pd1) with
pd1
rd1
< π (e), and rd1 < L.
Then, the agent can buy this contract, and, since insurance contracts are not exclusive, can complete
his insurance coverage with other contracts from the non-deviating insurance companies. Each agent
thus faces a new continuum of linear contracts which belong to the straight half-line P ′ (e) starting from
Cd1 and parallels but strictly below P (e). Assuming that IC has no intersection point with P (e) but
10 The indifference curve IC has no intersection point with P (e) neither for R < L nor for R > L and is tangent to
P (e) for R = L.
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R = L amounts to consider that for any contract along the straight half-line P (e) with a repayment
in case of accident R < L, the agent’s marginal willingness to pay is strictly higher than π (e).
For a given repayment R a decrease in the premium to pay P is equivalent to an increase in the
wealth of the agent. But, for a given repayment R the agent’s effort strictly decreases when his wealth
increases for R < R (P ).11 This implies that for a given repayment R < R (P ) the accident probability
strictly increases when the premium P decreases.
Consider first the case of CARA utility functions. For a given R with R < R (P ) the increase in the
probability of accident implies that the agent’s marginal willingness to pay in order to buy insurance
increases when the premium P decreases (cf., Lemma 3). Moreover, for R ≥ R (P ) the agent exerts the
lowest effort and the indifference curves exhibit the standard properties for CARA utility functions. In
particular, for a given R, the marginal rate of substitution does not change when P decreases. This
implies that the willingness to pay in order to buy insurance does not change when P decreases while
R is fixed. Therefore, for R < L the agent’s willingness to pay along the straight half-line P ′ (e) is
strictly higher than the marginal price of insurance π (e). Therefore, the agent also chooses to be fully
insured when he faces the new continuum of linear contracts which belongs to the straight half-line
P ′ (e). Indeed, for a repayment R = L there exists an indifference curve which is tangent to P ′ (e)
since the marginal rate of substitution of any indifference curve is equal to π (e) when R = L. Thus,
if an insurance company deviates and issues contract Cd1 the agent buys a global insurance contract
C1 for which he is fully insured. The agent thus exerts the lowest effort e
∗ = e which implies that the
expected profit of the deviating insurance company is negative.
Consider now the case of IARA utility functions. For R ≥ R(P ) the indifference curves exhibits
the standard properties in the case of IARA utility functions. Thus, for a given R with R(P ) ≤ R < L
the willingness to pay increases when P decreases, since a decrease in P is equivalent to an increase in
w and the agent becomes more risk averse when his wealth increases. For a given R with R < R(P ),
the agent’s willingness to pay necessarily increases when P decreases since the agent exerts a lower
level of effort which increases the probability of accident and he becomes more risk averse (cf., Lemma
3). Therefore, if an insurance company deviates and proposes contract Cd1 the agent buys a global
insurance contract for which he is fully insured. He thus exerts the lowest effort and the deviation is
not profitable for the deviating insurance company.
Finally, consider the case of DARA utility functions. For R ≥ R (P ) the indifference curves exhibits
the standard properties in the case of DARA utility functions. This implies that for a given R with
R (P ) ≤ R < L the willingness to pay now decreases when P decreases, since a decrease in P is
equivalent to an increase in w and the agent becomes less risk averse when his wealth increases. For
R < R (P ) there are two countervailing effects when P decreases while R does not change. The wealth
effect goes for a decrease in the willingness to pay. However, the agent exerts a lower effort, which
11 For a given (R,P ) the difference in utility when the accident occurs or when it does not (u (w − L+R− P )−u (w − P ))
decreases when w increases, since the utility function u(.) is increasing and concave. Therefore, ceteris paribus the agent’s
optimal effort decreases when w increases, since the marginal gain of effort decreases while the marginal cost of effort does
not change.
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increases the probability of accident. This effect goes for an increase in the willingness to pay. Finally,
Lemma 3 indicates that the latter effect dominates the former effect when condition CII is satisfied.
Thus, under condition CII the willingness to pay increases when P decreases while R does not change
and R < R (P ). This implies that for a given R when P decreases the willingness to pay increases
when R < R (P ) but it decreases when R (P ) ≤ R < L. However, when the probability of accident is
sufficiently decreasing with the level of effort for e = e (e.g., when |π′(e)| is high enough) the marginal
gain of effort is very important and the agent exerts an effort strictly higher than e even when R is close
to L. At the limit when lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞ then R (P ) = L (cf. Lemma 1). Thus, when |π′ (e)| increases
the interval R (P ) ≤ R < L shrinks and for |π′ (e)| high enough it almost disappears. Therefore, for
|π′ (e)| high enough the agent’s willingness to pay almost always increases when P decreases while R
does not change. This implies that if an insurance company deviates and proposes contract Cd1 the
agent buys a global insurance contract for which he is fully insured. He then exerts the lowest effort
and the deviation is not profitable for the deviating insurance company. Any deviation is thus not
profitable for an insurance company.
The following proposition sums up the previous results.
Proposition 1 For any CARA, IARA utility functions and for any DARA utility function satisfying
CII when |π
′ (e)| is high enough, there exists a linear equilibrium when IC has no other intersection
point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)). This linear equilibrium has the following properties:
• Each insurance company proposes a continuum of linear contract (ri, pi) with pi = π (e) ri.
• Each agent chooses to be fully insured: R∗ = L, and exerts the lowest effort e∗ = e.
• Each insurance company makes an expected profit equal to 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2 below, in which the global insurance contract C1 the agent
would buy if an insurance company deviated and issued contract Cd1 is also represented.
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Figure 1: Linear equilibrium and global insurance contract C1
Let us now look at the case in which IC has other intersection (or a tangent) points with P (e) for
R < R (P (e)).
4.2 Partial Insurance Equilibria
When IC has at least one other intersection point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)) the linear equilibrium
previously described is no longer an equilibrium. Indeed, the agent’s optimal effort and insurance choice
associated with a continuum of linear contracts (ri, pi) with pi = π (e) ri is no longer (e
∗ = e, ri = L).
For instance, as illustrated in Figure 2 below the agent strictly prefers to buy insurance contract C ′
which belongs to an indifference curve superior to IC.
)(PR
Figure 2: Contract C′ is preferred to (R = L;P = π (e)L)
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This case corresponds to the case in which the moral hazard problem is strong, in the sense that
the probability of accident significantly decreases when the agent exerts a level of effort strictly higher
than the lowest level of effort: e > e (cf. Lemma 5).
Taking into account that IC which is tangent to P (e) for R = L has at least one other intersection
point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)), the differentiability of the indifference curves (cf. Lemma 2) implies
that there must exist at least one level of effort e ∈ [e; e] for which the straight half-line P (e) admits
one indifference curve which is tangent to it both for R < R (P ) and for R > L. We however show
in the Appendix (See Proof of Lemma 6) that the straight half-line P (e) cannot admit an indifference
curve which is tangent to it for R < R (P (e)).
We thus have the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 When IC has at least one other intersection point with P (e) for R < R (P (e)) there exists
at least one level of effort e ∈ [e; e[ such that the straight half-line P (e) admits one indifference curve,
denoted ICe, which is tangent to P (e) both for R < R (P (e)) and for R > L.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider now that each insurance company issues a continuum of linear contracts (ri, pi) with
pi = π (eP ) ri where eP is a level of effort such that P (eP ) admits an indifference curve ICeP which is
tangent to P (eP ) both for R < R (P (eP )) and for R > L. Lemma 6 implies that eP < e. Maximizing
the expected utility of the agent amounts to choosing one of the two levels of insurance for which ICeP
is tangent to P (eP ). Since the agent is indifferent between these two possibilities, we can consider
that he chooses to be only partially insured. Consider now the effort exerted by the agent and let us
constraint the agent to choose an effort e ≤ eP . Given this constraint, the probability of accident is
π (e) ≥ π (eP ). Then, the agent’s optimal choice of insurance is characterized by R ≥ L. Hence, we can
state that for an insurance contract for which P (eP ) admits an indifference curve which is tangent to it
both for R < R (P (e)) and for R ≥ L the agent exerts an effort e ≥ e∗ > eP when he is only partially
insured. Thus, the expected profit of each insurance company which issues this type of contract is
strictly positive since the agent exerts an effort strictly higher than the effort on which the insurance
premium pi is based.
This situation is an equilibrium if and only if any deviation by an insurance company is not prof-
itable. Consider that an insurance company deviates and issues a single contract Cd2 = (rd2 , pd2) with
pd2
rd2
< π (eP ) and rd2 < L. Then, each agent faces a new continuum of linear contracts which belongs
to the straight half-line P ′ (eP ) starting from Cd2 and parallels but strictly below P (eP ). However,
ceteris paribus the agent’s effort strictly decreases with the agent’s wealth for R < R (P ). This implies
that, for a given repayment R < R (P ), the accident probability strictly increases when the premium
P decreases.
Consider first the case of CARA utility functions. For a given repayment R < R (P ), the agent’s
marginal willingness to pay in order to buy insurance coverage strictly increases when the premium P
decreases (cf., Lemma 3). However, for a given repayment R ≥ R (P ) the agent’s marginal willingness
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to pay so as to buy insurance is not modified when the premium P decreases, since the agent then exerts
the lowest effort e. In other words, when the agent is subject to moral hazard the standard property
of parallel indifference curves associated with CARA utility function is only valid when R ≥ R (P (e)).
This property is no longer true when R < R (P (e)). In this later case, the indifference curves become
steeper when the premium P decreases. Therefore, there is no longer any indifference curve which is
tangent to P ′ (eP ) for R < R (P
′ (eP )). Indeed, the indifference curve which is tangent to P
′ (eP ) for
R ≥ L corresponds first to the translated indifference curve of ICeP - denoted IC
T
eP
henceforth -for R ≥
R (P ′ (eP )) and then becomes steeper and is thus located strictly below IC
T
eP
for R < R (P ′ (eP )). This
latter indifference curve has thus no other tangent point with P ′ (eP ) for R < R (P
′ (eP )). Therefore,
if an insurance company deviates and issues a contract Cd2 the agent buys this contract and completes
his insurance coverage until he reaches a global insurance contract C2 for which R > L. He thus exerts
the lowest effort e∗ = e and the expected profit of the insurance company which deviates is negative.
Consider now the case of DARA utility functions. For R > L, the agent looses money when the
accident does not occur. Therefore, when P increases his willingness to buy (over)insurance decreases.
Indeed, for DARA utility functions an agent becomes more risk averse when P increases, since an
increase in P is equivalent to a decrease in wealth. Thus, for R > L, MRSagent(R,P ) is now strictly
decreasing in P (see equations (10) and (11) for e∗ = e). In other words, when P decreases the
indifference curves becomes steeper for a given repayment with R > L. The indifference curve which
goes through the point where ICTeP is tangent to P
′ (eP ) is necessarily steeper than IC
T
eP
and intersects
P ′ (eP ). This implies that the indifference curve which is tangent to P
′ (eP ) is tangent at the right
compare to the point where ICTeP is tangent to P
′ (eP ). Therefore, the indifference curve which is tangent
to P ′ (eP ) is located strictly below IC
T
eP
for a repayment R = L. For R (P ) ≤ R ≤ L the indifference
curves becomes flatter when P decreases while R does not change. However, when R < R (P ) Lemma 3
indicates that when condition CII is satisfied the indifference curves becomes steeper when P decreases
while R does not change. Moreover, we know from Lemma 1 that the interval R (P ) ≤ R < L shrinks
when |π′ (e)| increases and that it disappears at the limit when lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞ for which R (P ) = L.
This implies that for |π′ (e)| high enough there is no longer any indifference curve which is tangent to
P ′ (eP ) for R ≤ L. Indeed, the indifference curve which is tangent to P
′ (eP ) for R ≥ L is then strictly
steeper than ICTeP for any R < L− ε where lim|π′(e)|→+∞
ε = 0. The indifference curve which is tangent
to P ′ (eP ) for R ≥ L is thus also located strictly below IC
T
eP
for R ≤ L. Therefore, if an insurance
company deviates and issues a contract Cd2 the agent buys this contract and completes his insurance
coverage until he reaches a global insurance contract C2 for which R > L. Thus, each agent exerts the
lowest effort e∗ = e which implies that the expected profit of the insurance company which deviates is
negative.
The previous results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any CARA utility function and for any DARA utility function satisfying CII when
|π′ (e)| is high enough, there exists a linear equilibrium when IC has at least one other intersection point
with P (e) for R < R (P (e)). This linear equilibrium has the following properties:
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• Each insurance company proposes a continuum of linear contract (ri, pi) with pi = π (eP ) ri.
• Each agent chooses to be only partially insured: R∗ < L, and exerts an effort e∗ > eP .
• Each insurance company makes a strictly positive expected profit.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Moreover, the global insurance contract C2 that
the agent would buy if an insurance company deviated and issued contract Cd2 is also represented in
Figure 3.
)(PR
Figure 3: Linear equilibrium and global insurance contract C2
Finally, consider the case of IARA utility functions. For R > L, that is, in the case in which the
agent looses money when the accident does not occur, the agent’s willingness to buy (over)insurance
increases when P increases. Indeed, for IARA utility functions an agent becomes less risk averse
when P increases, since an increase in P is equivalent to a decrease in wealth. Thus, for R > L,
MRSagent(R,P ) is now strictly increasing in P (see equations (10) and (11) for e
∗ = e). In other
words, when P decreases the indifference curves becomes flatter for a given repayment with R > L.
The indifference curve which goes through the point where ICTeP is tangent to P
′ (eP ) is necessarily
flatter than ICTeP and intersects P
′ (eP ). This implies that the indifference curve which is tangent to
P ′ (eP ) is tangent at the left compare to the point where IC
T
eP
is tangent to P ′ (eP ). Therefore, it is
no longer the case that the indifference curve which is tangent to P ′ (eP ) is located below IC
T
eP
for a
repayment R = L, contrarily to the cases of CARA and DARA utility functions. This implies that
even if, for a repayment R ≤ L, MRSagent(R,P ) is strictly decreasing in P we cannot state that the
indifference curve which is tangent to P ′ (eP ) is located strictly below IC
T
eP
and thus does not intersect
or is tangent to P ′ (eP ) for R ≤ L. The deviation associated to Cd2 might thus be profitable and a
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partial insurance equilibrium might thus not exist in the case of IARA utility function. Of course, by
continuity a partial insurance equilibrium should exist for IARA utility functions close to CARA utility
functions. However, we cannot state general results in the case of IARA utility functions.
We are now going to study the second best efficiency of the linear equilibria.
5 Second Best Efficiency of the Linear Equilibria
Insurance company i’s isoprofit curve is such that
pi − π(e)ri = B, (12)
where B ∈ R+. Differentiating Equality 12 with respect to ri and to pi indicates that
dpi
dri
=
π(e) + π′(e)de
∗
dri
ri
1− π′(e)de
∗
dpi
ri
, (13)
where dpi
dri
indicates how the insurance premium must increase when the repayment increases marginally
so that insurance company i’s profit stays constant. dpi
dri
corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution
between ri and pi for insurance company i (denoted MRSInComp hereafter). Note that MRSInComp ≥ 0,
since π′(e) < 0, de
∗
dri
≤ 0 and de
∗
dpi
> 0.
An equilibrium is going to be second best Pareto efficient if it is impossible to increase both the
expected utility of an agent and the expected profit of an insurance company, or if it is impossible
to increase the expected utility of an agent (the expected profit of an insurance company) without
decreasing the expected profit of an insurance company (the expected utility of an agent). This is the
case if and only if, in equilibrium:
MRSInComp =MRSagent.
Without loss of generality, we are going to consider that in equilibrium an agent chooses to contract
with only one insurance company, since he is indifferent between contracting with one or with several
insurance companies. Using equations (10) and (13) we thus obtain that MRSInComp = MRSagent is
equivalent to
π(e∗) + π′(e∗)de
∗
dR
R
1− π′(e∗)de
∗
dP
R
=
π(e∗)u′ (w− L+R− P )
π(e∗)u′ (w −L+R− P ) + [1− π(e∗)]u′ (w − P )
. (14)
We are now going to study the case of the full insurance equilibrium.
5.1 Full Insurance Equilibrium
Consider that moral hazard is weak. The equilibrium then implies full insurance R = L and the
agent exerts the lowest level of effort e∗ = e. Consider now any global insurance contract for which
R ≥ R(P (e)). We then have de
∗
dR
= 0 = de
∗
dP
. The LHS of Equality 14 reduces to π(e). Moreover,
for R = L and P = π(e)L the RHS of Equality 14 also reduces to π(e). Equality 14 is thus satisfied
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in this case. The full insurance equilibrium is thus locally second best Pareto efficient. Determining
whether the full insurance equilibrium is globally second best Pareto efficient amounts to find if IC-
the indifference curve which goes through (R = L;P = π(e)L) -intersects or not the isoprofit curve
which goes through (R = L;P = π(e)L). Consider that the moral hazard problem is particularly weak
in the sense that π(e) ≃ π(e), ∀e ∈ ]e, e]. Then by continuity with the case in which there is no moral
hazard, the full insurance equilibrium must be (second best) Pareto optimal. Consider now that IC
is tangent to P (e) = π(e)R both for R = L and for R < R(P (e)). The isoprofit curve is confounded
with the straight half-line P (e) = π (e)R for R ≥ R(P (e)), but is located strictly below P (e) = π (e)R
for R < R(P (e)), that is, when e∗ > e. Therefore, close to the second tangent point to P (e), for
which the agent is not fully insured, IC is necessarily located strictly above the insurance company’s
isoprofit. This implies that the full insurance equilibrium is not second best Pareto optimal, as it is
illustrated on Figure 4 below. Indeed, any point in area A is preferred both by the agent and by the
insurance company to the full insurance equilibrium. Therefore, by continuity, when IC is only tangent
to P (e) when R = L, but admits at least one other repayment point, with R < R(P (e)), for which IC
is close to P (e), then the full insurance equilibrium is not second best Pareto optimal. This implies
that depending on the function π(e) the full insurance equilibrium could be either second best Pareto
optimal or not.
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Figure 4: The Full Insurance Equilibrium is not Second Best Pareto Optimal
The following proposition sums up the previous results.
Proposition 3 The full insurance equilibrium could be or not second best Pareto optimal. For instance,
when the moral hazard problem is particularly weak in the sense that π(e) ≃ π(e), ∀e ∈ ]e, e], then the
full insurance equilibrium is second best Pareto optimal. Contrarily, when there is at least one repayment
point, with R < R(P (e)), for which IC is close to P (e) = π(e)R, then the full insurance equilibrium is
not second best Pareto optimal.
We are now going to study the case of partial insurance equilibria.
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5.2 Partial Insurance Equilibria
Consider now that hazard moral problem is strong. Then in equilibrium there is partial insurance
R∗ < L. Suppose that a partial insurance equilibrium is second best Pareto efficient. This implies that
equality 14 is satisfied in equilibrium. Consider now that the expected profit function of an insurance
company is modified and becomes Πi(α, ri, pi, e) = pi − απ(e)ri, with, for instance, α > 1 (e.g. α
corresponds to a functioning cost of the insurance company). Modifying the insurance profit function
does not modify the (partial insurance) equilibrium since it is determined by the agent’s preferences
which are still the same. However, now
MRSInComp =
α
[
π(e∗) + π′(e∗)de
∗
dri
ri
]
1− απ′(e∗)de
∗
dpi
ri
.
Therefore, if the equality MRSInComp = MRSagent was verified with Πi(ri, pi, e) = pi − π(e)ri, this
equality is necessarily not verified with Πi(α, ri, pi, e) = pi−απ(e)ri for any α = 1 and the partial insur-
ance equilibrium is no longer second best Pareto optimal. Therefore, any partial insurance equilibrium
is not generically second best Pareto efficient.
We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Any partial insurance equilibrium is not generically second best Pareto efficient.
We thus have shown that when insurance contracts are not exclusive linear equilibria are not nec-
essarily second best Pareto optimal. This result has two important consequences. First of all, a
"laissez-faire" policy is not necessarily the best choice for a government. A government intervention in
the insurance market could increase the social welfare of the economy. Moreover, our results also sug-
gest that it could be better for the economy in terms of social welfare to oblige people to sign exclusive
contracts only with the insurance companies, since any equilibrium would then be second best Pareto
optimal. Note that even if exclusive contracts might be preferable for the economy, insurance companies
might prefer non-exclusive contracts since, when partial insurance equilibria exist, they then obtain a
strictly positive expected equilibrium profit which would not be the case in a perfectly competitive
insurance market with exclusive contracts.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we use a common agency games framework to study linear prices equilibria in a com-
petitive insurance market in which contracts are nonexclusive, insurance companies do not face any
restriction on their pricing rules and agents are subject to moral hazard. We show that a linear equi-
librium always exists in the case of CARA utility functions since an agent’s willingness to pay for more
insurance is increasing in wealth. For IARA utility functions a linear equilibrium always exists under
the previous property when moral hazard is weak, while it might not exist when moral hazard is strong.
Finally, in the case of DARA utility functions, the existence of a linear equilibrium relies on the previous
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property but also on a property on the function which links the probability of accident to the effort
exerted by the agent. We also show that two different types of linear equilibria can exist. When moral
hazard is weak then we have a full insurance equilibrium in which each agent is fully insured, exerts
the lowest effort and each insurance company’s expected profit is equal to zero. Contrarily, when moral
hazard is strong there exist partial insurance equilibria in which each agent is only partially insured,
exerts an effort strictly higher than the lowest effort and each insurance company’s expected profit is
strictly positive.
These results give microeconomics foundations to any work which restricts insurance companies
to offer linear contracts only. Moreover, for CARA utility functions the linear equilibrium existence
property is very robust since it does not rely on any assumption relative to the function which links the
probability of accident to the effort exerted by the agent. The same result holds for IARA utility func-
tions when moral hazard is weak. However, for DARA utility functions a linear equilibrium could not
be taken as always granted since the linear equilibrium existence property does rely on an assumption
on the function linking the probability of accident to the agent’s effort.
We also provide a welfare analysis of the linear equilibria. We show that the full insurance equi-
librium can either be, or not, second best Pareto optimal depending on the properties of the function
which links the probability of accident to the agent’s effort. Moreover, any partial insurance equilibria
is not generically second best Pareto optimal.
These results could thus justify a government intervention on the insurance market and for instance
the imposition of exclusive contractual relationship with insurance companies so as to restore the
(second best) Pareto optimality.
23
A Proof of Lemma 5
Consider the constrained indifference curve CIC(e, π (e) , u) in which the agent is constrained to
exert the level of effort e with e ∈ ]e; e] and which is associated to the level of utility u, where
u = u (w− π (e)L) − e. CIC (e, π (e) , u) is well shaped and either intersects or not the straight
half-line P (e) = π (e)R. There is thus necessarily a particular value π (e) ≡ πT for which there exists
a value of reimbursement RT , with RT < L, such that CIC
(
e, π (e) = πT , u
)
is tangent to P (e). The
couple
(
RT ;πT
)
corresponds to the solution of System 1, and is such that: π
Tu
(
w− L+RT − π (e)RT
)
+
(
1− πT
)
u
(
w − π (e)RT
)
− e = u,
πTu′(w−L+RT−π(e)RT )
πTu′(w−L+RT−π(e)RT )+[1−πT ]u′(w−π(e)RT )
= π(e).
(System 2)
Doing the same for all e ∈ ]e; e] and defining πT = π (e) = β with β ∈ ]0, 1[ for e = e we have built
a particular function πT (e) (as well as RT (e)) for any e ∈ [e; e].12 Consider now the unconstrained
indifference curve associated to πT (e) and u. This particular indifference curve, which we denote
IC
(
πT (e)
)
is, by construction, confounded with a segment of P (e) for e ∈ ]e; e[.
The proof of Lemma 5 is in three steps.
Step 1: Constrained indifference curves
For any given e ∈ ]e; e], CIC(e, π (e) , u) is such that
π (e)u (w − L+R− P ) + (1− π (e))u (w − P )− e = u. (15)
Consider now that π (e) > πT (e). Then for R = RT (e), System 2’s first equality can only be
satisfied if and only if P decreases. This implies that CIC (e, π (e) , u) is strictly below CIC(e, π (e) =
πT (e) , u). Thus, when π (e) > πT (e), CIC (e, π (e) , u) does not intersect P (e). This implies that
when π (e) > πT (e) ∀e ∈ ]e; e], none of the constrained indifference curves intersects P (e).
Consider now that π (e) < πT (e). Then for R = RT (e), System 2’s first equality can only be satisfied
if and only if P increases. This implies that CIC (e, π (e) , u) is strictly above CIC(e, π (e) = πT (e) , u).
Thus, when π (e) < πT (e), CIC (e, π (e) , u) does intersect P (e). Therefore, in order to have at least
one constrained indifference curve CIC (e, π (e) , u) which is tangent or which intersects P (e) it suffices
to have for one level of effort (at least) e ∈ ]e; e], π (e) ≤ πT (e).
Step 2: Comparing the unconstrained indifference curve IC to CIC (e, π (e) , u)
Suppose that IC intersects one constrained indifference curve CIC (e, π (e) , u) at point (Rinter;Pinter).
This implies that IC goes through a point- denoted (Rbelow;Pbelow) -which necessarily belongs to a con-
strained indifference curve associated to the same level of effort but located strictly belowCIC (e, π (e) , u).
We thus have a contradiction. Indeed any constrained indifference curve located strictly belowCIC (e, π (e) , u)
and associated to the same level of effort is necessarily associated to a level of utility strictly higher
12 For e = e we know that CIC (e, π (e) , u) is necessarily tangent to P (e) for RT = L.
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than u. Thus, (Rinter;Pinter) and (Rbelow;Pbelow) cannot both belong to IC. Doing the same reasoning
for any level of effort e ∈ [e; e] we obtain that IC cannot intersect any constrained indifference curve
associated with a level of utility u.
Step 3: Using Step 2 and Step 3
Consider that ∀e ∈ [e; e] we have π (e) > πT (e). Thus, from Step 1, we know that none of the
constrained indifference curves CIC (e, π (e) , u) intersects P (e). Thus, IC which is by construction
built from points which belongs to the constrained indifference curves CIC(e, π (e) , u) does not intersect
P (e). Consider now that there is at least one level of effort e ∈ ]e; e] for which π (e) ≤ πT (e). Then,
from Step 1 we know that there is (at least) one constrained indifference curve which either intersects
or is tangent to P (e) for a level of effort e ∈ ]e; e]. Moreover, we know from Step 2 that IC never
intersects any constrained indifference curve CIC (e, π (e) , u). Thus, since IC is tangent to P (e) for
R = L and dP
dR
≥ 0, IC necessarily either intersects or is tangent to P (e) for a level of effort e ∈ ]e; e].
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let insurance company i offers a menu of linear contracts Mi = (ri, pi) with pi = π (e) ri. Since IC has
no intersection point with P (e) for any R = L, each agent optimally chooses R = L and exerts the
lowest level of effort e∗ = e. The expected profit of each insurance company is thus equal to 0: ∀i ∈ I,
EΠi (ri = L, pi = π (e)L, e
∗ = e) = π (e)L− π (e)L = 0.
Let now an insurance company deviate and offer a single contract characterized by the couple
(rd1 , pd1) with
pd1
rd1
< π (e) and rd1 < L. Let P
′ (e) be the straight half-line starting from (rd1 , pd1)
and parallels but strictly below P (e). The line P ′ (e) represents the set of insurance contracts which
are now available to the agent. Let us define ICT as the translated of IC tangent to P ′ (e) at point
(R = L,π (e)L− γ). For R ≥ R (P ′ (e)) we know that all indifference curves are "well shaped", that
is, increasing at a decreasing rate and that MRSagent (R = L) = π (e). Thus, there exists one and
only one (unconstrained) indifference curve which is tangent to P ′ (e) at point (R = L,π (e)L− γ).
We denote IC (P ′ (e)) this indifference curve. The indifference curve IC (P ′ (e)) has by definition no
intersection or tangent point to P ′ (e) for R > L. Consider now that R < L. For CARA utility functions
IC (P ′ (e)) and ICT are confounded one with the other for R (P (e)) ≤ R < L, while Lemma 3 implies
that IC (P ′ (e)) is strictly below ICT for 0 ≤ R < R (P (e)). For IARA utility functions IC (P ′ (e)) is
always strictly below ICT when R < L. For R (P (e)) ≤ R < L this is due to the properties of IARA
utility functions, since MRSagent then increases when P decreases. For 0 ≤ R < R (P (e)) Lemma 3
implies that IC (P ′ (e)) is strictly below ICT . Finally, consider the case of DARA utility functions.
Lemma 3 implies that under condition CII , for a given R with R < R (P ), the unconstrained indifference
curves become steeper when P decreases. Moreover, Lemma 1 indicates that R (P ) = L ∀ P when
lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞. Thus, when lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞ the unconstrained indifference curve which is tangent
to P ′ (e) at point (R = L, π (e)L− γ) is necessarily below ICT . This result still holds for |π′ (e)| high
enough by continuity. Therefore, for CARA, IARA and DARA utility functions satisfying condition
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CII when |π
′ (e)| is high enough, if an insurance company deviates and offers contract (rd1, pd1) the
agent optimally buys this contract and completes it in order to get (R = L,π (e)L− γ). The agent
thus exerts the lowest level of effort e∗ = e and the expected profit of the deviating insurance company
offering contract (rd1 , pd1) is strictly negative, since
pd1
rd1
< π (e). The deviation is not profitable.
C Proof of Lemma 6
For R ≥ R (P ) the agent exerts an effort e∗ = e and each indifference curve is then "well shaped" (i.e.
increasing and at a decreasing rate). This implies that for any straight half-line P (e) there exists a
unique indifference curve tangent to it. Moreover, MRSagent = π (e) for R = L and MRSagent > π (e)
for R ∈ [R (P ) ;L[. Thus, the indifference curve tangent to P (e) is necessarily tangent for R = L, while
for any e > e the indifference curve tangent to P (e) is necessarily tangent for R > L.
Consider now that e = e. Then, there is no indifference curve with several intersection points to
P (e) for R < R (P (e)). Suppose the contrary and consider Point A on Figure 5 below.
P
L R
)(PR
ReeP )()( pi=
Point A
IC
Figure 5
Consider the constrained indifference curve going through Point A and for which the agent is
constrained to exert an effort equal to eA, where eA ≡ e
∗ (Point A). The slope of this constrained
indifference curve is equal to π (eA) for R = L and strictly higher than π (eA) for R < L. Moreover,
the slope of the non-constrained indifference curve going through Point A is equal to the slope of the
constrained indifference curve going through Point A only at Point A. Thus, MRSagent computed at
Point A is strictly higher than π (eA). Besides, Point A in Figure 5 above is by construction such that
π (e) > MRSagent at Point A. Therefore, we should have:
π (e) > MRSagent computed at (Point A) > π (eA) , (16)
which is impossible, since by definition e ≥ eA and thus π (e) ≤ π (eA). A contradiction.
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Consider now that there exists one indifference curve which is tangent to P (e) for R < R(P (e)).
Denote
(
P˜ , R˜
)
the tangent point with R˜ < R (P (e)) and e˜ ≡ e∗
(
P˜ , R˜
)
. Consider the constrained
indifference curve going through
(
P˜ , R˜
)
and for which the agent is constrained to exert an effort equal
to e˜. The slope of this constrained indifference curve is equal to π (e˜) for R = L and is strictly higher
than π (e˜) for R < L. Moreover, the slope of the non-constrained indifference curve going through(
P˜ , R˜
)
is only equal to the slope of the constrained indifference curve going through
(
P˜ , R˜
)
precisely
at the point
(
P˜ , R˜
)
, since then the agent optimally exerts the effort e˜. Thus, MRSagent computed at(
P˜ , R˜
)
is strictly higher than π (e˜). Furthermore, since
(
P˜ , R˜
)
is the tangent point to P (e), MRSagent
computed at
(
P˜ , R˜
)
should also be equal to π (e). Therefore, we should have:
π (e) =MRSagent computed at
(
P˜ , R˜
)
> π (e˜) , (17)
which is impossible, since by definition e ≥ e˜ and thus π (e) ≤ π (e˜). A contradiction.
Therefore, since for e = e, there is one indifference curve which is tangent to P (e) for R = L and
which has at least one other intersection point with P (e) for R < R(P (e)), the differentiability of the
indifference curves (cf. Lemma 2) implies by continuity that there must exist at least one level of effort
e, with e ≤ e < e, such that the straight half-line P (e) admits an indifference curve which is tangent
to P (e) both for R < R (P (e)) and for R > L.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Let insurance company i offers a menu of linear contracts Mi = (ri, pi) with pi = π (eP ) ri, where
eP is such that there exists an indifference curve, denoted ICeP which has two tangent points with
P (eP ). There is one tangent point for R < R (P (eP )) and the agent exerts an effort e ≥ e
∗ > eP .
We denote this tangent point
(
RTR<R, P
T
R<R
)
henceforth. Besides, there is another tangent point for
R > L and the agent exerts the lowest effort e∗ = e. We denote this other tangent point
(
RTR>L, P
T
R>L
)
henceforth. Since the agent is indifferent between the two tangent points we can consider that he chooses(
RTR<R, P
T
R<R
)
. Moreover, we have π (eP )R
T
R<R > π
(
e∗
(
RTR<R, P
T
R<R
))
RTR<R since the agent exerts
an effort e ≥ e∗
(
RTR<R, P
T
R<R
)
> eP . The expected profit of an insurance company is thus strictly
positive.
Consider now that an insurance company deviates and offers the single contract (rd2 , pd2) with
pd2
rd2
< π (eP ). Let P
′ (eP ) be the straight half-line starting from (rd2 , pd2) and parallels but strictly
below P (eP ). The line P
′ (eP ) represents all the insurance contracts which are now available to the
agent. For R ≥ R(P ′ (eP )) all indifference curves are "well shaped", that is, increasing at a decreasing
rate. Moreover, MRSagent(R = L) = π (e) > π (eP ) implies that there exists one and only one
(unconstrained) indifference curve which is tangent to P ′ (eP ) for a repayment R > L. We denote
IC (P ′ (eP )) this indifference curve. Let IC
T
ep
be the translated of ICep tangent to P
′ (e) both at points(
RTR<R, P
T
R<R − κ
)
and
(
RTR>L, P
T
R>L − κ
)
. For CARA utility functions ICTep and IC (P
′ (eP )) are
confounded one with the other for R ≥ R (P (e)). However, for R ≤ R (P (e)) Lemma 3 implies that
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IC (P ′ (eP )) is strictly below IC
T
ep
. Therefore, IC (P ′ (eP )) which is the only indifference curve tangent
to P ′ (eP ) for R > L (at
(
RTR>L, P
T
R>L − κ
)
) never intersects or is tangent to P ′ (eP ) for R ≤ L.
Consider now DARA utility functions. For R > L, e∗ = e and MRSagent is then equal to
dP
dR
=
π (e)u′ (w − L+R− P )
π (e)u′ (w − L+R− P ) + [1− π (e)]u′ (w− P )
. (18)
For a given repayment R with R > L, MRSagent (R,P ) is going to be strictly decreasing in P if and
only if
∂MRSagent(R,P )
∂P
< 0 or equivalently if
∂MRSagent(R,P )
∂w
> 0, since P and −w play the same role in
the agent’s utility function. Using equation (18),
∂MRSagent(R,P )
∂w
> 0 if and only if
−
u′′ (w − P )
u′ (w− P )
> −
u′′ (w − L+R− P )
u′ (w− L+R− P )
,
which is the case since R > L and −u
′′( )
u′( ) is decreasing in the case of DARA utility functions.
13
Thus, the indifference curve which goes through
(
RTR>L, P
T
R>L − κ
)
is necessarily steeper than ICTep
and intersects P ′ (eP ). This implies that the indifference which is tangent to P
′ (eP ), i.e., IC (P
′ (eP )),
is necessarily tangent to P ′ (eP ) for a repayment R > R
T
R>L (i.e., the tangent point is located at the
right of
(
RTR>L, P
T
R>L − κ
)
). Moreover, for L ≤ R ≤ RTR>L IC (P
′ (eP )) is necessarily strictly below
ICTep since MRSagent (R,P ) is strictly decreasing in P for R > L. For R < L we know that, for a
given R with R < R (P ), the unconstrained indifference curves become steeper when P decreases when
condition CII is satisfied (cf. Lemma 3). Moreover, Lemma 1 indicates that R (P ) = L ∀ P when
lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞. Thus, when lim
e→e
π′ (e) = −∞ the unconstrained indifference curve which is tangent
to P ′ (eP ) is also strictly below IC
T
ep
. Therefore, IC (P ′ (eP )) does not intersect or is not tangent to
P ′ (eP ) for R < L. For |π
′ (e)| is high enough this result still holds by continuity.
Thus, for CARA and DARA utility functions satisfying condition CII when |π
′ (e)| is high enough,
if an insurance company deviates and offers contract (rd1, pd1) the agent optimally buys this contract
and completes it in order to get a repayment R > L. The agent thus exerts the lowest level of effort
e∗ = e and the expected profit of the deviating insurance company offering contract (rd2 , pd2) is strictly
negative, since
pd2
rd2
< π (eP ). The deviation is not profitable.
13 For R > L, e∗ = e and de
∗
dw
= 0.
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